The mediating role of growth opportunity in good corporate governance-stock return relationship by Rakha Wardhana et al.
313
Investment Management and Financial Innovations, Volume 14, Issue 3, 2017
Abstract
Improving the welfare of its owner or shareholder and maximize shareholder value 
through increased firm’s value should be one of the goals in establishing a com-
pany. Consequently, it becomes essential for the company to continue to increase 
its value in order to retain the trust of its shareholders, for instance by conducting 
good corporate governance (GCG). On the other hand, from the owner’s point 
of view, it is important to not only evaluate the corporate governance, but also to 
take a look at firm’s growth opportunity, because it basically reflects the manage-
ment’s productivity. Studies related to the influence of corporate governance on 
stock return have been extensively done before. Similarly, this research is related 
to the influence of growth opportunity on stock return. However, it is still dif-
ficult to find studies that combine these three variables, therefore this study aims 
to know the influence of good corporate governance on stock return directly and 
indirectly through firm’s growth opportunity by using sample data of 92 observa-
tion Corporate Governance Perception index lists in Indonesia Stock Exchange 
for 2010–2014. The analysis method of this research is the quantitative approach 
by hypothesis testing through path analysis performed with SmartPLS 3.0. The 
direct hypothesis result showed that: (1) good corporate governance did not have a 
significant influence on firm’s growth opportunity while; (2) it also had a negative 
influence and did not have a significant influence on stock return, and (3) firm’s 
growth opportunity had a significant influence on stocks return. However, the in-
direct hypothesis result showed that firm’s growth opportunity could not mediate 
the relationship between good corporate governance and stock return.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the goals in establishing a company is not only to improve the 
welfare of its shareholder, but also to maximize shareholder’s value 
through increased firm’s value which is reflected in its stock price. The 
higher stock price volatility shows the decrease of investor confidence 
in the results of firm’s performance. Therefore, it becomes essential 
for the company to continue to increase its value in order to retain 
the trust of its shareholders, for instance by implementing good cor-
porate governance (GCG) (Brigham & Houston, 2001; Huang, 2010). 
Companies should implement GCG principles, which include trans-
parency, accountability, independence, responsibility, and fairness, in 
order to create good corporate governance. With the implementation 
of GCG, the decision-making process will take place better so that it 
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will create optimal decisions, improve the efficiency of operational performance, and create an excel-
lent work culture such as working effectively and efficiently so as to decrease the cost of capital and able 
to minimize risk, it can also increase investor confidence to save their funds in the form of company 
shares, hence, the volatility of stock prices may decrease (Huang, 2010; KNKG, 2006; Maksum, 2005; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Koerniadi, 2014).
Eduardus (2010) asserted that investors as the shareholders of the company certainly expect high 
returns in the future as the result obtained from investments they have made. Thus, in order to 
evaluate the stock returns, investors need to not only evaluate company’s performance in terms of 
corporate governance, but also by take a look at the company’s growth opportunity which is basi-
cally a ref lection of the productivity of the company and is a desired achievement of the internal 
company (management), as well as external parties (investors and creditors). High growth oppor-
tunities will give company a higher earning opportunity in the future. This will certainly give a 
positive effect on stock returns (Mas’ud, 2008). Companies which have high growth opportunities 
generally require external funds to expand, thus encouraging companies to make improvements 
in the implementation of corporate governance in order to lower the cost of capital (Darmawati et 
al., 2004).
Although there are still many inconsistent results, research related to the influence of corporate gover-
nance on stock return has been done extensively before. Similarly, the research is related to the influence 
of growth opportunity on stock return. However, it is still difficult to find studies that combine these 
three variables. Therefore, it is interesting to not only see whether the implementation of corporate gov-
ernance and firm’s growth opportunity affect the stock return, but also the relationship between the 
two variables, and also see whether the actual growth opportunity mediates the influence of corporate 
governance on stock returns.
1. LITERATURE REVIEW
1.1. Agency theory
Jensen and Meckling (1976) defined agency rela-
tionship as a contract where one or more principals 
assigned other party (agent) to perform service in 
the name of principals with delegating authority of 
decision-making to agent. In this case, the princi-
pals are shareholders and/or investors, while agents 
are management or corporate manager. Yet, on the 
other hand, agency theory perspective stated that 
there is a segregation between firm owner and firm 
manager that will cause information asymmetry 
between manager as agent and firm owner as prin-
cipal. Manager will tend to act for his own inter-
est instead of shareholder interest. The information 
asymmetry can be minimized by implementing 
GCG. With the implementation of GCG, the deci-
sion-making process will take place better so that it 
will create optimal decisions and thus increase the 
shareholder trusts (Huang, 2010).
1.2. Good corporate  
governance  
and stock return
A good corporate governance system will pro-
vide effective protection to shareholders and 
creditors to get back on their investment as rea-
sonably, appropriately, and efficiently as pos-
sible, and ensure that management is perform-
ing the best as they can for the company’s in-
terests. Huang (2010) asserted that stock price 
f luctuations are closely related to the decrease 
of investor confidence in the results of corpo-
rate performance and weak corporate gover-
nance. Stock price volatility will certainly affect 
the stock return. This is in line with Rostami 
(2016) who examined the effects of corporate 
governance components on listed companies in 
Tehran Stock Exchange where the results indi-
cate a positive relationship between the compo-
nents of good corporate governance on stock re-
turns. Morey et al. (2009) also found that there 
is an abnormal return around the date of the an-
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nouncement of corporate governance informa-
tion on emerging market countries that have the 
similar capital market efficiency to Indonesia 
where results indicate significant corporate gov-
ernance impact on stock returns. However, sev-
eral other studies have shown contradictory re-
sults that good corporate governance variables 
have no effect on stock returns in Asia and else-
where (Budiharjo, 2016; Toudas & Bellas, 2014; 
Kouwenberg et al., 2012). Therefore, this study 
proposes the following:
H1: Firm’s good corporate governance positively 
influences stock return.
1.3. Good corporate  
governance and  
growth opportunity
Himmelberg et al. (2002) asserted that inves-
tor protection will increase the willingness of 
investors to provide funding for the company 
and this is ref lected in lower costs and the avail-
ability of larger external funding. This indicates 
that companies which need large funding in the 
future will benefit greatly from the implementa-
tion of good corporate governance at this time. 
In addition, great growth opportunity compa-
nies will need to raise larger external funding 
for expansion and therefore require improve-
ment on good corporate governance mecha-
nisms as a form of a better protection to minori-
ty shareholders and then will tend to lower their 
capital costs. Therefore, this study proposes the 
following:
H2: Firm’s good corporate governance positively 
influences firm’s growth opportunity.
1.4. Growth  
opportunity and  
stocks return
Growth is the impact of the f low of corporate 
funds from operational changes caused by 
growth or decrease in business volume, it is a 
growth opportunity for a company in the future 
(Mai, 2006). Company growth can be realized 
by using the investment as efficient as possible. 
The growth indicator used is asset growth or 
total assets used for the company’s operational 
activities (Amalia, 2011). Although Anggrahini 
(2016) and Quynh-Nhu (2009) asserted that 
growth opportunity has no significant inf lu-
ence on stock return, yet companies that have 
rapid growth often have to increase their fixed 
assets, therefore the growth of high assets will 
increase the return. High growth companies 
choose to use stocks to mark the company’s op-
erations, while companies with low growth op-
portunities will choose to use long-term debt 
(Hemuningsih, 2013). Moreover, high growth 
opportunities will give company a higher earn-
ing opportunity in the future. This will cer-
tainly have a positive effect on stock returns 
(Mas’ud, 2008). Therefore, this study proposes 
the following:
H3: Firm’s growth opportunity positively influ-
ences stock return.
1.5. The mediating  
effect of growth  
opportunity
High growth opportunities will give you a high-
er earning opportunity in the future. This will 
certainly give a positive effect on stock returns. 
Firms with high growth opportunities generally 
require external funds to expand, so there is a 
need for improvements in the implementation 
of corporate governance undertaken by firms 
in order to reduce the cost of capital (La Porta 
et al., 1999; Klapper & Love, 2002) in Wardani 
(2008). Companies that have the ability to grow 
or invest will be more profitable, which will 
ultimately affect the good performance of the 
company. The need for external funding is sig-
nificantly related to good corporate governance 
indicators. This result provides support for the 
hypothesis that a growing company with a great 
need for external financing has more incentives 
to adopt good corporate governance practices 
(Durnev & Kim, 2005). Therefore, this study 
proposes the following:
H4: Firm’s growth opportunity mediates the rela-
tionship between good corporate governance 
and stocks return.
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2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The relationship among variables in this study is 
presented in a research model in Figure 1.
2.1. Operational definitions and 
measurement
2.1.1. Good corporate governance (X)
The value of the corporate governance of each 
company can be seen in the Corporate Growth 
Perception Index (CGPI), which is the rating of 
the implementation of corporate governance re-
ported by The Indonesian Institute for Corporate 
Governance (IICG) in cooperation with SWA 
Magazine to determine corporate ranking in the 
use of corporate governance in Indonesia. CGPI 
score starts from 0 to 100. If the company has a 
score close to or reach a value of 100, indicating 
that the company is getting better in implement-
ing corporate governance.
2.1.2. Growth opportunity (Z)
Growth opportunity is a future company’s growth 
opportunity (Mai, 2006). Companies that have 
rapid growth often have to increase their fixed as-
sets. Another definition of growth opportunities is 
the change in total assets owned by the company 
(Kartini & Arianto, 2008). The indicator used in this 
study is asset growth which means is a representa-
tion of the increase or decrease (growth) of assets 
every year. Systematically asset growth can be for-
mulated according to Mas’ud (2008, p. 83) as follows:
Growth opportunity
Total asset 1 Total year 
.
Total year 
t
t
=
+ −=  (1)
2.1.3. Stock return (Y)
Return is the result obtained from the investment 
(Fidhayatin & Dewi, 2012, p. 205). The sources of 
stock returns consist of two main components: 
dividend yield and capital gain (loss). This study 
calculates the stock return by using capital gain 
(loss), i.e., the current stock price is reduced by 
the stock price of the previous period compared 
to the previous period stock price. According to 
Jogiyanto (2000), the formula to calculate the 
stock return is as follows:
1
1
,t t
it
t
P P
R
P
−
−
−=  (2)
where 
t
P  – stock price in t  period, 1tP−  – stock 
price in 1t −  period.
The return of the company stock is measured by 
using the value of closing price in the related year. 
The dividend component is not included in the 
calculation, because it has the potential to cause 
an outlier, and is done on the grounds to be able to 
know the actual stock price changes.
2.2. Research design and data 
collection procedure
The type of data used in this study is second-
ary data from companies listed on the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange (BEI) which are included in the 
rating of Corporate Governance Perception 
GROWTH 
OPPORTUNITY (Z)
H1
H2
H4
H3
GOOD CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE (X)
STOCK 
RETURN (Y)
Figure 1. Research model
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Index (CGPI) by The Indonesian Institute for 
Corporate Governance (IICG) and CGPI rank-
ing report for the period 2010–2014. The clos-
ing stock price data are obtained from yahoo 
finance. Sources of data used in this study were 
obtained from the Indonesia Stock Exchange 
(BEI) website www.idx.co.id and the IICG re-
port from the www.iicg.org website. Secondary 
data were collected using archive data collection 
techniques. These secondary data include audit-
ed financial statements on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange website, the results of corporate gov-
ernance assessment by IICG published by SWA 
magazine, as well as stock price data at year-end 
closing on the Yahoo finance website to assist in 
the selection of company samples.
The research hypotheses will be tested quanti-
tatively by using SmartPLS v. 3.0. (Partial Least 
Square) software and by path analysis. It is more 
commonly used and suitable for social research 
thus it is used in this study.
3. RESULT AND DISCUSSION
The result of conformity evaluation of conceptual 
model in Figure 2 shows that all variables in this 
study have loading factor value 1.00. This is be-
cause each variable in this study has only one indi-
cator. Therefore, in this study, there is no indicator 
that needs to be dropped.
Table 1. Loading factor value
Indicator Growth opportunity
Stock 
return
CGPI 
score 
CGPI – – 1.00
GROWTH 1.00 – –
RETURN – 1.00 –
0.053
0.086
Growth 
opportunity
CGPI score Stock return 
GROWTH 1.000
CGPI 1.000 0.0102 –0.017 RETURN1.000
0.231 0.296
Figure 2. Algorithm of outer output model
Growth 
opportunity
CGPI score Stock return 
GROWTH 0.000
CGPI 0.000 0.153 RETURN0.000
1.832 3.574
Figure 3. Bootstrapping output result
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3.1. Hypotheses testing result
3.1.1. Inner model PLS testing
Table 2 and Figure 3 show that there are three 
paths available and only one path in the model 
has a significant effect. The coefficient value of the 
path marked positive on the original sample (O) 
shows the relationship of these variables is linear 
or proportional. The coefficient value of the path 
marked negatively indicates the relationship of the 
variable is opposite.
Table 2. Inner model PLS testing result
Path
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Growth opportunity → → Stock return 0.30 0.30 0.08 3.57* 0.00
CGPI score →  → Growth opportunity 0.23 0.23 0.13 1.83 0.07
CGPI score →  → Stock return –0.02 –0.02 0.11 0.15 0.88
3.1.2. Mediating effect testing
Tables 3 and 4 below showed the indirect influence 
of good corporate governance on stock return 
through firm’s growth opportunity.
Table 3. Indirect influence testing
Hypothesis
P
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H1 X → Z → Y 0.07 –0.02 0.05
Table 4. P-values of indirect influence result
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CGPI score → → Stock return 0.07 0.07 0.05 1.46 0.14
4. DISCUSSION
4.1. The influence of firm’s good 
corporate governance on stock 
return
Hypothesis 1 (H1) stated that the firm’s good cor-
porate governance positively influences stock re-
turn. However, this study showed different results 
with the hypothesis 1. The influence of good cori-
porate governance on stock return has an original 
sample of –0.02, meaning that the more compa-
nies apply good corporate governance, the lower 
return of stocks obtained by the company. The 
influence is not large enough, because the signifi-
cance from the t-statistics is 0.15 < 1.96 so the path 
is not significant, hence, hypothesis 1 (H1) is re-
jected. The results of this study are in line with re-
search conducted by Bauer et al. (2004) indicating 
that there is no significant influence on good cor-
porate governance and stock return. The negative 
results of this study are also in line with Sugiyanto 
(2010) who states that in large companies, GCG 
has a negative and not significant effect on stock 
returns. This is because the negative effect on 
large companies is caused by institutional own-
ership as a GCG measurement tool. Investors of 
this institution generally consist of holding com-
panies that are affiliated (Sugeng, 2010). Therefore, 
the public responds negatively to that matter. The 
CGPI assessment conducted by IICG is not mere-
ly a benchmark for investors to provide external 
financing for the company, because the program 
is voluntary. By its voluntary nature, it cannot be 
ascertained whether all good companies have fol-
lowed the assessment so that CGPI scores have no 
effect on investors’ decisions to invest.
4.2. The influence of firm’s good 
corporate governance on firm’s 
growth opportunity
Hypothesis 2 (H2) stated that the firm’s good cor-
porate governance positively influence the firm’s 
growth opportunity. The influence of good cor-
porate governance to growth opportunity has an 
original sample of 0.23 means that the company 
has better corporate governance, the better the 
growth opportunity of the company. However, 
the effect is not large enough, because the signifi-
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cance is seen from the t-statistics of 1.83 < 1.96 so 
the path is not significant, so the hypothesis 2 (H2) 
of this study is rejected. This study is in line with 
Webb (2006) and Khanchel (2007) who shows that 
growth opportunity is not influenced by good 
corporate governance. This is because the imple-
mentation of good corporate governance is more 
long-term and is expected to also provide benefits 
in the long term so that the response to the imple-
mentation of corporate governance itself will be 
difficult to measure if in the short term. The lack of 
consistency of the company’s participation in this 
survey each year, this is demonstrated during the 
observation year (2010–2014) many inconsistent 
corporate samples participate consecutively each 
year. This allows for a lack of clarity of the appar-
ent tendency or low influence of CGPI on growth.
5. OPPORTUNITY
5.1. The influence of firm’s growth 
opportunity on stock return
Hypothesis 3 (H3) stated that the growth oppor-
tunity of the company affects the stock return. 
The influence of growth opportunity on stock 
return has an original sample of 0.3, it means 
that the better growth opportunity of the com-
pany the higher the return of stock received. The 
significance of GCG to corporate growth oppor-
tunity is seen from the t-statistics of 3.57, since 
t-statistics > 1.96 then the pathway is significant, 
so the hypothesis 3 (H3) of this study is accept-
ed. This research is in line with the research of 
Agustina (2007) and Quynh-Nhu (2009) where 
growth opportunity has a significant effect on 
abnormal return. The results of this study in 
line with the pattern of thinking researchers, 
i.e. companies that have increased fixed assets 
means the company has a good opportunity to 
grow, because there is an investment in fixed as-
sets productive and if the company has a chance 
to grow then the company will have the ability to 
bring profits so that the company will increase 
investor confidence to invest and then will give a 
bigger stock return.
5.2. The influence of good corporate 
governance on stock return 
through firm’s growth 
opportunity
Hypothesis 4 (H4) stated that the firm’s growth 
opportunity mediates the influence of good cor-
porate governance on stock returns. The amount 
of influence of good corporate governance to 
growth opportunity is 0.23 where the value of sig-
nificance of good corporate governance on growth 
opportunity of the company seen from t-statistics 
of 1.83, because the value of t-statistics < 1.96 then 
the path is not significant. However, the influence 
of firm’s growth opportunity on the stock return 
is 0.03 with the significance seen from the t-sta-
tistics of 3.57 and greater than 1.96 so the path is 
significant. In determining whether the growth 
opportunity variable mediates the good corporate 
governance relationship on stock return, a signifi-
cant relationship between the variables is required. 
Thus, the hypothesis 4 (H4) is rejected. The re-
sults of this study indicate that the implementa-
tion of good corporate governance will not bring 
significant influence to the level of growth oppor-
tunity of the company. This implies that compa-
nies which followed the survey are not necessarily 
companies that have good operating performance 
that ultimately affects the growth opportunity, be-
cause the survey is also followed voluntarily. In 
addition, the magnitude of the firm’s growth op-
portunity rate is likely to be largely due to factors 
influencing the growth opportunity. Factors other 
than good corporate governance implementation, 
such as good skills owned by labor and company 
management in managing its assets and macro-
economic conditions such as rupiah exchange rate 
and interest rate should be considered.
CONCLUSION
Several conclusions can be drawn based on the result of this study. First of all, good corporate gover-
nance has an insignificant influence on stock return. This is mainly due to the voluntary nature of CGPI 
assesstment. It cannot be ascertained whether all good companies have followed the assessment so that 
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CGPI scores have no effect on investors’ decisions to invest. Second, this study revealed that growth 
opportunity turns out is not influenced by good corporate governance, since the implementation of 
good corporate governance is more long-term thus expected to provide benefits in the long term as well, 
therefore it is difficult to measure the effect in the short term.
Third, growth opportunity provides the ability to bring profits that can affect the stock return. The 
existence of institutional ownership as a function of monitoring in good corporate governance mecha-
nism makes public respond negatively. At last, since good corporate governance has no significant effect 
on firm’s growth opportunity, thus it can be concluded that the variable growth opportunity is not a 
suitable mediating variable between good corporate governance and stock return. Therefore, investors 
should pay attention to factors other than the implementation of good corporate governance in the 
company. 
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTION
The challenge for future research is to increase years of research and consider examining companies 
that have the same character (e.g., banking, manufacturing companies, etc.) in order to obtain more 
accurate results and subsequent research. Another measurement on the implementation of good corpo-
rate governance, growth opportunity, and stock return is also important in order to get another insight.
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